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 Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze economies of scale for German mutual fund complexes. Using 
2002-2005 data of 41 investment management companies, we specify a hedonic translog cost 
function. Applying a fixed effects regression on a one-way error component model there is 
clear evidence of significant overall economies of scale. On the level of individual mutual 
fund complexes we find significant economies of scale for all of the companies in our sample. 
With regard to cost efficiency, we find that the average mutual fund complexes in all size 
quartiles deviate considerably from the best practice cost frontier.  
JEL Classification: G2, L25  
Keywords:  mutual fund complex, investment management company, cost efficiency, 
economies of scale, hedonic translog cost function, fixed effects regression, one-way error 
component model   2 
1  Introduction 
The investment industry is of increasing importance for both retail and institutional 
investors in Germany. What began with solely EUR 24 billion of assets under 
management in 1980 has become a nearly EUR 1.7 trillion industry by the end of 2007 
(BVI (2008)). Despite this growth in the last years, the share of household financial 
assets held in mutual funds of approximately 15 % is relative low in comparison to a 
share of more than 23 % in the U.S. (BVI (2008), ICI (2008)). Therefore, the growing 
demand for retirement saving in Germany will fuel future growth and enforce 
competition not only between different kinds of financial institutions, but also within 
the mutual funds industry. 
In this paper, we analyze economies of scale and cost efficiency for mutual fund 
complexes operating in the German market which are  fundamental issues  for 
understanding the role of the investment industry in the economy. Furthermore, the 
existence (or non-existence) of scale economies may  support policy makers in 
implementing effective regulation to protect investors without preventing competition. 
For example,  in the current European Commission's proposal to reform the UCITs 
directive (undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities, UCITS IV) 
it is mentioned that the objective of the reform is to ''make it easier for the industry to 
achieve cost savings and specialization benefits across the single market.'' Cost 
efficiency is considered, because growing in size may result in frictional losses due to 
bureaucracy and related coordination costs as described e.g. in Williamson (1988). 
We find that German mutual fund complexes exhibit significant economies of scale 
not only on average, but all of the complexes in our sample exhibit significant complex 
specific economies of scale. An even more interesting point is the corollary of this 
result that none of the complexes feature diseconomies of scale regardless of its size. 
But these scale economies decrease as the size of the mutual fund complex increases. 
Furthermore, large complexes exhibit considerable cost inefficiencies with regard to 
their smaller peers. 
In the course of the paper, we follow SEC (1966)  in defining a mutual fund 
complex as a ''group of funds under common management''.
1
                                                       
1  We will use the term mutual fund complex in order to make clear that we are dealing with costs on the 
level of complexes and not on the level of funds. 
 In Germany, mutual fund 
complexes are of the contractual type. Hereby, the assets of the managed mutual funds 
are separated from the assets of the complex. The mutual fund complex becomes the   3 
trustee and the investors are the beneficiaries. From a legal point of view the mutual 
fund itself is a special asset pool which must be strictly separated from the complexes' 
own assets. This separation of assets provides investor protection in case of bankruptcy 
of the mutual fund complex which operates usually in the form of a limited liability 
company or a joint stock corporation. The unit certificates held by the investors are 
special securities representing a contractual claim of the unit-holder against the mutual 
fund complex. Yet, they do not represent the typical rights of a stock owner, e.g. unit 
holders cannot appoint new fund managers, directors, or board members. Another 
peculiarity of the German investment industry is the separation of retail and institutional 
funds. Retail funds are the classic mutual funds which are open for private and 
institutional investors alike. In contrast, institutional funds are only accessible to 
institutional investors that are incorporated legal entities. Institutional funds serve as a 
way to outsource the management of the assets of institutional investors within the 
framework of the German investment regulation. The major difference between  the 
regulation of retail and institutional funds is the less restrictive reporting requirements 
for the latter. 
There are three strands of literature regarding cost economies of scale in the mutual 
funds industry.
2
But as already pointed out by Glazer (1970), there may be costs in operating a 
mutual fund complex which have to be borne by more than one fund. According to Sirri 
and Tufano (1993), mutual fund complexes may achieve economies of scale e.g. in 
trading and execution, customer record keeping and reporting, or marketing and 
distribution. By studying economies of scale on the level of individual mutual funds the 
costs for these shared activities are not properly considered. Therefore, another strand 
of the literature examines scale economies on the level of the single mutual fund 
thereby taking into account the assets of the mutual fund complex in different ways. 
 One part of the literature analyzes costs on the level of individual 
mutual funds (Ferris and Chance (1987), Ferris and Chance (1991), McLeod and 
Malhotra (1994), Dellva and Olson (1998), Rea et al. (1999), Ang and Lin (2001), Luo 
(2002), Golec (2003), and Malhotra et al. (2007)). These studies find strong evidence 
for cost economies of scale dependent on the asset size of the individual mutual fund. 
Contrary to these findings is the result of Droms and Walker (2001)  who find no 
significant economies of scale for costs on the level of individual mutual funds. 
                                                       
2  Economies of scale may also play an important role in determining the performance of mutual funds. 
Due to our analysis of scale economies on the complex level, we cannot cover this issue. For more on 
this topic see e.g. Perold and Salomon (1991), Philpot et al. (1998), Indro et al. (1999), and Chen et al. 
(2004).   4 
The studies of Tufano and Sevick (1997), Latzko (1999), Deli (2002),  Dowen and 
Mann (2004), and Khorana et al. (2008) consider not only the assets under management 
of the mutual fund, but also the assets under management of the complex that the fund 
belongs to. They find strong evidence of cost economies of scale both at the level of the 
individual mutual fund and the overall complex. Lesseig et al. (2002) use administration 
and management fees as cost variables. They find economies of scale at the complex 
level for both cost specifications, but economies of scale at the level of the individual 
mutual funds are only present using administration fees as the cost variable. In the study 
of Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) there are only economies of scale on the complex 
level. Christofferson (2001) and Berkowitz and Kotowitz (2002) use the number of 
funds of the complex as variable. They find evidence for economies of scale for the 
assets under management of the individual mutual funds as well as for the number of 
funds of the complex to which the funds belong to. Malhotra and McLeod (1997) 
consider the mutual fund complex by introducing a dummy variable. Again, there are 
economies of scale both on the level of the mutual funds and the complex. 
Finally, there are studies of cost economies of scale which focus on the mutual fund 
complex itself. Baumol et al. (1990) investigate the cost structure of U.S. mutual fund 
complexes for the years 1982 to 1987. They find strong evidence of scale economies. 
This result is confirmed by Collins and Mack (1997) by using a more recent data set of 
U.S. mutual fund complexes for the time period 1990 to 1994. In their study of the 
French mutual fund industry for the year 1987, Dermine and Roeller (1992) detect scale 
economies for small to mid-sized institutions. Bonanni et al. (1998) confirm these 
results using data of the French mutual fund industry for the years 1987 and 1989. 
In Germany, trading expenses are directly debited to the assets under management 
of the individual fund. The same applies to  the costs for reporting and auditing. 
Therefore, scale economies for these costs on the complex level would directly be 
reflected on the fund level. The costs for marketing and distribution are paid by the 
investor in the form of a front-end load at the time of purchase. Typically, the front-end 
load is a percentage of the issue price of the fund unit. Thus, potential economies of 
scale in marketing and distribution will not be  passed on to the investors. Instead, 
distributors and the mutual fund complexes reap the full benefits of potential economies 
of scale. This is one part of the costs we analyze at for scale economies. The main costs 
which accrue at  the level of the funds relate to  portfolio management, accounting 
including compliance with investment regulation, and  the  management  of the 
shareholder accounts. These are the costs which have to be covered by the management   5 
fees debited to the fund’s assets and these are the second type of costs we focus on in 
our analysis of economies of scale. 
In this manner we follow the statement of Baumol et al. (1990) that an analysis of 
scale economies in the mutual fund industry requires the consideration of the operating 
processes which are implemented at the complex level. Therefore, our analysis of scale 
economies will be carried out on the level of mutual fund complexes. 
Although the amount of assets managed by mutual fund complexes rivals the assets 
managed by other financial institutions in Germany
3
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we study scale economies on 
the level of mutual fund complexes which has scarcely been done before. Second, we 
analyze economies of scale for the German investment industry building upon a unique 
data set. Third, we study economies of scale for a balanced sample of mutual fund 
complexes over time, i.e. we do not only cover a longer time period, but also examine 
the same complexes over this time period. Fourth, we use the number of funds and not 
, in contrast to the banking and 
insurance industry there is sparse empirical research on economies of scale for the 
investment industry in Germany. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze scale economies for 
German mutual fund complexes. The investment industry in Germany is a natural 
candidate for such analysis. The value chain of German mutual fund complexes covers 
the major parts of the investment process. Consequently, evaluating the costs of single 
complexes allows us to evaluate the costs of the investment process in Germany as a 
whole. Employing a sample of mutual fund complexes for the years 2002 to 2005, we 
specify a hedonic translog cost function and then apply panel data estimation 
techniques. The calculated scale economies are significant for the overall sample as 
well as for all of the individual complexes. As expected the magnitude of the economies 
of scale is highest for the smallest quartile of complexes. More interesting still is the 
finding that the degree of scale economies even for the largest quartile of mutual fund 
complexes is significantly less than one. This implies that the investment industry in 
Germany has not yet reached its optimal size. With regard to cost efficiency, our results 
show that for all size quartiles cost efficiency considerably deviate from the sample 
optimum. Therefore, costs for mutual fund complexes may not only be reduced by 
increasing the number of funds, but also by enhancing the operating processes. 
                                                       
3  At the end of 2006, private households in Germany invested EUR 1.5 trillion in bank deposits, EUR 
1.1 trillion in insurance products, and EUR 0.5 trillion in mutual funds (Bundesbank (2007)). 
Comprehensive overviews of the German banking and insurance industries can be found in Hackethal 
(2004) and Maurer (2004), respectively.   6 
the assets under management as output variable. Finally, we apply panel data estimation 
techniques. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The data and the applied 
econometric specifications are presented in section 2 and 3, respectively. The empirical 
results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes and provides an outlook for 
further research. 
2  Data 
Our study is based on a combined time series and cross-section dataset for 41 German 
mutual fund complexes over the period 2002 to 2005. The primary sources of data were 
the balance sheets and income statements of German mutual fund complexes. We 
received additional data concerning the assets under management, the number of funds 
and the net fund flows  from the German investment industry association 
(Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e.V., BVI) and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
During the years covered by our panel the mutual fund industry in Germany exhibited 
growth in assets under management corrected for net fund flows of 7.34 % (BVI 
(2004), BVI (2006), BVI (2007)). This overall growth rate is composed of the growth 
rates for retail and institutional funds which are 9.27 % and 5.63 %, respectively. Since 
these numbers are net of fund flows, the difference in the growth rates of retail and 
institutional funds reflects the more conservative asset allocation of the latter due to 
regulatory requirements.
4
In absolute terms the assets under management of the German investment 
  The overall growth in assets under management is 
accompanied by a minor decrease in the number of funds by 0.27 %. However looking 
at retail and institutional funds separately, there is a discrepancy in the growth in the 
number of funds. The number of retail funds grew by 5.36 % whereas the number of 
institutional funds decreased by 4.23 %. Since the number of institutional funds is 
approximately twice the number of retail funds, the increase in the number of retail 
funds more than compensates for the decline in the number of institutional funds. The 
sharp decline in the number of institutional funds can be explained by a change in 
German investment law at the beginning of 2004 which simplified the merger of funds 
for institutional investors. 
                                                       
4  The net growth rate reflects the average performance for the funds of the investment industry as a 
whole. The overall gross growth rate is 9.37 %. Therefore, net fund flows account for roughly 2 % in 
asset growth per year. The same applies to the gross growth rates for retail and institutional funds 
which are 11.41 % and 7.67 %, respectively.   7 
management industry increased from EUR 862bn in 2002 to EUR 1.160bn in 2005. The 
corresponding numbers for retail (institutional) funds were EUR 382bn (480bn) in 2002 
and EUR 545bn (EUR 615bn) in 2005. In this period of time the number of funds 
slightly decreased from 7,402 in 2002 to 7,064 in 2005. The number of retail funds 
increased from 2,077 in 2002 to 2,452 in 2005 and for institutional funds the number 
decreased sharply from 5,325 in 2002 to 4,608 in 2005. The number of mutual fund 
complexes which are members of the BVI increased from 72 in 2002 to 79 in 2005.
5
Wherever possible (and appropriate) we divide our sample into subsamples. Firstly, 
we distinguish between the product types of security
 
6
 
  and real estate funds. The 
majority of funds offered by German mutual fund complexes are of the first type. Very 
few mutual fund complexes offer real estate funds. Secondly, we differentiate between 
investor categories of retail and institutional investors. Since mutual fund complexes in 
Germany may offer security and real estate funds for retail as well as for institutional 
investors, it is possible (and it is the case in our sample) that companies belong to both 
product as well as to both investor categories. 
Finally, we divide the total sample into four size quartiles based on the number of 
funds offered by the mutual fund complexes. Size quartile 1 contains the smallest 25 % 
of the complexes, size quartile 2 the next 25 % of the complexes, and so on. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Since we are dividing our sample into size quartiles, one has to look at the stability of 
these quartiles. Therefore, table 1 represents the transition probabilities between the size 
quartiles for the period 2002 to 2005. The composition of the size quartiles remains 
relatively stable over time, in particular for the years 2003 to 2004. For the whole time 
period of the sample, more than 80 % of the complexes remain in their respective size 
quartile. Due to the balancing of our sample, this implies that the order of mutual fund 
complexes in our sample ranked on the basis of the number of funds changes in the 
sample period. 
We deal with the exiting and entering of units over time which is a familiar problem 
of panel data by balancing our sample to mutual fund complexes for which data is 
available over the entire period. 
                                                       
5  A more thorough review of the German investment management industry can be found in Maurer 
(2004).   8 
Table 2 here 
 
To get an idea of the representativeness of our data compared to the industry, we 
report in table 2 the share of the number of funds of our sample and subsamples with 
respect to the total industry.
7
In table 3, summary statistics for the sample are reported. For the total sample, 
operating expenses correspond to approximately TEUR 2,118.82 per fund.
 The shares of our sample are in the region of 70 % for 
each category, except for complexes offering real estate funds. These numbers are 
higher than the share of our sample of the number of companies which are a member of 
the BVI (on average 55 %). Since there are also mutual fund complexes which are not 
members of the BVI, the higher shares indicate that our sample contains complexes 
with a larger fund base. Therefore, extrapolating our results to the German investment 
industry as a whole should be done with caution. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
8
Institutional funds (TEUR 716.71) are less cost intensive than retail funds (TEUR 
2,192.85). This result confirms the expectation that the costs of managing institutional 
funds are lower than for their retail counterpart, because of less reporting requirements 
 As was to 
be expected, the operating expenses are lowest (TEUR 128.06) for the largest 25 % of 
the mutual fund complexes, i.e. for size quartile 4. More interesting is the dispersion of 
this size quartile (TEUR 67.32) which is by far the lowest of all size quartiles. This 
indicates homogeneity in the cost structure of large complexes. Evaluating the values of 
operating expenses and average fund size for size quartile 1 should be done with 
caution, since this size quartile mainly consists of mutual fund complexes offering real 
estate funds. Therefore, the columns for size quartile 1 and for the product type of real 
estate funds resemble each other. 
Differentiated by product type, real estate funds (TEUR 7,367.55) are clearly more 
expensive to manage than security funds (TEUR 272.04). This might reflect the lack of 
standardization for real estate funds due to the heterogeneity of the underlying property 
portfolios. 
                                                                                                                                                           
6  Security funds comprise equity, bond, and money market funds. 
7  Since the number of funds is used as output variable in the cost function, we also base our size 
calculations on this measure. 
8   Operating expenses contain material costs, personal expenses, and depreciation as reported in the 
profit and loss statement.   9 
and the fact that there is only one investor for most of the institutional funds. Again, a 
word of caution is in order here. In Germany, there are more mutual fund complexes 
offering real estate funds for retail than for institutional investors. Therefore, the 
statistics for complexes offering retail funds are biased by the higher share of real estate 
funds in the product range. 
The average mutual fund complex in our sample offers almost 108 funds. For security 
funds and funds offered to institutional investors the number of funds is slightly higher 
(137 and 123, respectively). The number of retail funds is nearly the same as for the 
overall sample (109), whereas the number of real estate funds offered on average is 
only approximately 10. Therefore, size quartile 1 consists mainly of mutual fund 
complexes offering real estate funds. 
Mutual fund complexes in our sample manage on average EUR 13bn of assets. The 
assets increase from size quartile 2 (EUR 3.72bn) to 4 (EUR 31.15bn) as anticipated. 
Again, the average assets under management reported for size quartile 1 of EUR 6.95bn 
are upwardly biased by the high share of complexes offering real estate funds. The 
assets under management of complexes offering security funds (EUR 14.69bn) are 
twice as large as the assets for complexes offering real estate funds (EUR 7.69bn) 
whereas the average assets of mutual fund complexes offering funds to retail or 
institutional investors are very similar (EUR 13.28bn and EUR 13.60bn, respectively). 
An interesting result is that the average fund size and most notably its dispersion, is 
decreasing from the second to the fourth size quartile. Therefore, an increase in the 
number of funds is accompanied by a disproportionately lower increase in the assets 
under management. This is line with the expectation that mature funds are larger than 
newly launched funds. 
The largest mutual fund complexes are also the oldest ones in our sample (29.70 
years). Indeed, the size quartile for the largest complexes contains the first mutual fund 
complexes founded in Germany. The youngest complexes are in size quartile 2 and 
have a mean age of 12.59 years. Again, the age for size quartile 1 may be biased by the 
real estate fund complexes. 
Finally,  almost  all  of the companies in our sample (39.5) offer retail funds. The 
majority also offer funds to institutional investors (35.25). The major product types 
offered are security funds (32) whereas only a minority offer real estate funds (10.75).   10 
3  Methodology 
3.1  Econometric specification of the cost function 
For our analysis of economies of scale we employ a hedonic translog cost function. 
The translog cost function is used because of its flexibility and advantages over other 
types of cost functions (see e.g. Christensen et al. (1973) and Caves et al. (1980)). The 
inclusion of hedonic variables allows us to also take into account the characteristics of 
the outputs. We model total costs C of a mutual fund complex as a function of one 
output level y, five hedonic variables  , 5 ,..., 1 , = g hg   and two dummy variables 
2 , 1 , = l dl . Therefore, the hedonic translog cost function in its general form for 
company n at time t is specified as follows 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
In order to estimate equation (1), we utilize a one-way error component model for 
the disturbance, i.e. 
 
(2) 
 
whereby  n µ   denotes the unobservable complex-specific effect and  t n v ,   is the 
remainder disturbance. 
Pooled ordinary least squares (hereinafter known as POLS) and random effects 
estimation by generalized least squares (hereinafter known as GLS) of equation (1) may 
yield biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters if the individual effects are 
correlated with the included independent variables (see Hausman and Taylor (1981)). 
Since we include time-invariant variables in our cost function in form of dummy 
variables, such correlation will be present. This problem can be overcome by the 
within-transformation of the data followed by the running of an ordinary least squares 
regression on the transformed data resulting in the fixed effects estimator. But this 
transformation also wipes out all the time-invariant variables, so that in our case the 
coefficients of the dummy variables cannot be estimated by fixed effects (hereinafter 
known as  Within). Therefore, we also apply an instrumental variables estimation 
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procedure (hereinafter known as HT) following the approach of Hausman and Taylor 
(1981). 
Furthermore, we test for fixed effects by performing an F-test (see e.g. Baltagi 
(2005)) and we also test for random effects using the LM-test derived by Breusch and 
Pagan (1980).  In order to test  the presence of a  correlation between the individual 
effects and the independent variables, the specification test (Hausman (1978)) and its 
more general form by  Chamberlain (1982),  as described by Arellano (1993),  are 
employed. 
3.2  Measures of scale economies and cost efficiency 
Following Fuss and Waverman (1981) and Baumol et al. (1990) we standardize the 
output variable in our analysis to have a mean of one. This standardization facilitates 
the calculation of the scale measure. Overall economies of scale (OES) are thus given 
by 
 
(3) 
 
This measure of scale economies is referred to as ray scale elasticity which can also be 
expressed as (see e.g. Lang and Welzel (1996)) 
 
 
 
Therefore, OES is the relative cost increase caused by a relative increase in output.
9
1 b OES =
  
Due to the standardization of the output variable, the evaluation of scale economies 
at the sample mean results in  . In addition, we calculate complex specific 
economies of scale at the time-series means for the output variable of the individual 
complexes. 
Scale economies are present if the OES  measure is less than one. To test the 
statistical significance, the standard error of the OES measure has to be computed. 
 
(4) 
 
 
                                                       
9  Since we are considering only one output, we do not have to bother about the critical assumption of 
the ray scale elasticity that all outputs are raised proportionately. 
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By evaluating equation (4) at the sample mean, this reduces to 
 
(5) 
 
Furthermore, from the estimated cost function, measures of overall cost efficiency will 
be calculated. Given equation (1) an indicator for overall cost efficiency is derived 
using the individual effects  n µ  as in Lang and Welzel (1996). The mutual fund complex 
with the lowest intercept is the most efficient one in the sample and is assumed to be on 
the cost frontier, i.e. is assumed to be cost efficient. The efficiency measures of the 
other complexes are  calculated relative to this complex. Therefore, overall cost 
efficiency (OCE) of mutual fund complex n is calculated as 
 
(5) 
 
where  ] ] 1 , 0 ∈ n OCE   and  41 = N .
10
n OCE
  Equation  (5)  provides a measure of the relative 
change in costs for complex n, if it would use the operating processes of the most 
efficient complex in the sample. Lower levels of  imply higher levels of 
inefficiency. 
3.3  Description of the variables 
We define total costs (C) as operating expenses which are comprised of material 
costs, personal expenses, and depreciation as reported in the profit and loss statement. 
Personal expenses are the biggest part of the operating expenses. Since they are mainly 
fixed costs
11
To model mutual fund complexes we do not follow the literature and treat the 
number of funds instead of assets under management as output y. As already pointed 
out by Baumol et al. (1990), the definition of output for a mutual fund complex is not a 
, an increase in the number of funds will result in less personal expenses 
per fund. Material costs generally  include costs for leases, advertising expenditure, 
software licenses, advisory fees, and fees for outsourcing of services. Finally, 
depreciation costs include the depreciation of furniture and office equipment as well as 
software licenses. 
                                                       
10  See e.g. Baltagi (2005) for the recovering of company specific intercepts  n o a µ + . 
11  Personal expenses can be treated as fixed costs, because the launch of new funds does not imply that 
new employees are recruited, e.g. fund managers and accountants are normally responsible for more 
than one fund. 
[ ]2
1
1) ( ) ( b Var OES Std =
[ ] ) ( ) ,..., ,..., min( exp 0 0 0 1 0 n N n n a a a a OCE µ µ µ µ + − + + + =  13 
trivial issue. In the literature on scale economies for mutual fund complexes, assets 
under management are usually considered as the output measure (Baumol et al. (1990), 
Dermine and Roeller (1992), Collins and Mack (1997), Malhotra and McLeod (1997), 
Bonanni et al. (1998), Latzko (1999)). We decide in favor of the number of funds as the 
output measure, because a fund is what one can best call the distinct product of a 
mutual fund complex. Thus, funds provide a reasonable basis for the aggregation of 
output within a complex (see Baumol et al. (1990)) on this point).
12
In addition, we include a dummy variable for the location of the mutual fund 
complexes' headquarters. This dummy variable takes on a value of one if the 
headquarter is located in the metropolitan area of Frankfurt/Main and zero otherwise. 
We choose this metropolitan benchmark location, because it is the most important 
financial center in Germany. There may be two opposing effects. On the one hand, the 
living costs and lease prices in Frankfurt/Main are one of the highest in Germany, so 
 
The hedonic variables account for complex specific characteristics that may affect 
costs. First, we include the log of the assets under management as a control variable. 
Since assets under management are usually used as the output variable, we can check if 
the number of funds already captures all of the size effect we are interested in by 
including assets as control variable. We expect a negative impact of assets on costs. 
To account for the different product types of security and real estate funds offered 
to retail and institutional investors we include the share of retail real estate, institutional 
security, and institutional real estate funds as control variables. We expect that the 
higher the share of real estate funds is, the higher the costs will be. Because each 
property in every fund is unique, there are no scale economies which can be exploited. 
Due to investor specific requirements in the portfolio construction for institutional 
funds there is less standardization in managing institutional funds than for retail funds. 
Therefore, we also expect higher costs for complexes offering institutional funds. 
Differences in industry expertise and technology are captured by the log of age of 
the mutual fund complexes. Age is calculated as the difference between the respective 
time period and the year that authorization by the supervisory authority was granted. 
We do not know what sign to expect ex ante, because there might be two opposing 
effects. On the one hand, more mature complexes have had the time to establish 
efficient investment processes. On the other hand, these complexes may have become 
slack in their operations and therefore exhibit inefficiencies in their cost structure. 
                                                       
12  To check the robustness of our results we also estimated equation (1) with assets under management 
as output variable. The results are qualitatively the same and are provided by the authors upon   14 
one might expect higher costs for companies located in this area. On the other hand, the 
industry expertise and competition in this area might be higher than in other areas 
which may result in lower costs due to more efficient operating processes. In our 
sample, approximately 56 % of the complexes (23 out of 41) are located in this 
metropolitan area. 
A second dummy variable is included which takes on the value of one if the mutual 
fund company is a subsidiary of a corporation and zero otherwise. In Germany, most of 
the complexes are subsidiaries of banks, insurance companies or part of a financial 
conglomerate. Being a subsidiary may result in lower costs due to the provision of 
costless or cheaper than common resources by the parent company. But there is also the 
possibility that the subsidiary will be debited with higher than common costs for these 
resources. In our sample, approximately 90 % of the complexes (37 out of 41) are 
subsidiaries. 
Following the notation in Greene (2003) of the HT estimator, we treat the number 
of funds, assets under management, and business share variables as time-varying and 
uncorrelated with the individual effects. We will denote these variables by  1 x . Age is 
also time-varying, but assumed to be correlated with the individual effects. This 
variable is denoted as  2 x . Finally, the dummy variables are time-invariant and 
correlated with the individual effects. They are denoted as  2 z . 
4  Empirical Results 
The coefficients of the hedonic translog cost function, estimated with the one-way 
error component model by the different estimators described in section 3.1, are reported 
in table 4. The F-test for testing fixed effects and the LM-test for testing random effects 
are both highly significant at the 1 % level, so in both specifications individual effects 
are present. The Hausman-test as well as the Chamberlain-test are also significant at the 
1  % level suggesting that correlation between the independent variables and the 
individual effects are present. Although, the test for the identifying restrictions of the 
HT model as described in Hausman and Taylor (1981) only rejects the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between the independent variables and the individual effects at the 10 
% level, we choose the HT specification as the preferred model. This decision can be 
supported by the fact that the coefficient estimates for number of funds, assets under 
management, and the age variable are close to the efficient estimates of the within-
                                                                                                                                                           
request.   15 
specification. Only in respect of the business share variables are there considerable 
deviations in the estimates between these two models. 
With the exception of the assets under management and the  business share of 
institutional security funds all coefficients are significant at least at the 5 % level. The 
output variable both in linear and quadratic form has positive signs implying positive 
cost elasticity. The assets under management only have a minor effect on costs and the 
coefficient is not significant anyway. Thus, the number of funds already captures the 
size effect we are interested in. 
The higher the share of real estate funds on the product range there is, the higher 
the costs are. The positive sign of the age variable suggests that more mature complexes 
do not benefit from technical progress. Mutual fund complexes that are located in the 
metropolitan area of Frankfurt/Main and which are subsidiaries face substantially 
higher costs. 
The parameter estimates of the HT specification for the number of fund variables 
are used in equation (3) to calculate measures of economies of scale. For each size 
quartile, a typical mutual fund complex with the size quartile means of the variables 
entering the hedonic translog cost function is generated for each year and then averaged 
over all years. We evaluate the measures of economies of scale and cost efficiency for 
the overall sample and for each size quartiles. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
Table 5 represents the estimates of scale economies for the whole sample as well as 
for the size quartiles. The reported measure of scale economies can be interpreted as 
follows; if it less than one, economies of scale are present; if it is equal to one, there are 
constant returns to scale. Finally, if it is greater than one, diseconomies of scale are 
present. 
As can be seen from table (5), there are significant economies of scale for the entire 
sample as well as for the size quartiles. The measures are considerably and statistically 
significant less than one. This result is qualitatively in line with the previous literature 
on scale economies on the level of mutual fund complexes. But our results are 
quantitatively far lower than the values presented by  Dermine and Roeller (1992), 
Collins and Mack (1997), and  Bonanni et al. (1998). The results that are the most 
similar to ours are reported by Baumol et al. (1990) who calculate measures of scale 
economies between 0.423 and 0.871 for different model specifications. The difference   16 
may be due to the fact that in the study of Baumol et al. (1990) only complexes offering 
money market funds are considered. The difference between our results and those of 
Dermine and Roeller (1992)  and  Bonanni et al. (1998) may  be caused by the 
domination of complexes offering money market funds in their samples. 
As anticipated, there is a clear size trend related to the measure of economies of 
scale. This confirms the results of Dermine and Roeller (1992), Collins and Mack 
(1997), Bonanni et al. (1998). The most important point is that the largest 25 % of the 
mutual fund complexes in our sample still exhibit considerable scale economies which 
are contrary to results produced in previous literature. In Dermine and Roeller (1992) 
the five largest complexes exhibit a scale measure of 0.962. This result is confirmed in 
Bonanni et al. (1998) where the five largest complexes show diseconomies of scale with 
a scale measure of 1.33. The results in Collins and Mach (1997) also suggest that the 
largest complexes exhibit diseconomies of scale with a scale measure of 1.059. In our 
sample all complexes exhibit economies of scale and no diseconomies, irrespective of 
their size as in Baumol et al. (1990). 
Another method to determine the degree to which economies of scale are related to 
the output level is by computing the rank correlation between the measure of economies 
of scale and the output measure (Baumol et al. (1990)). The rank correlation between 
the measure of economies of scale and the number of funds enables the assessment 
whether mutual fund complexes with relatively greater economies of scale offer 
relatively more funds to their clients. In our sample, the rank correlation coefficients are 
equal to one for each of the years 2002 to 2005 and for each of the regression 
specifications. This result is similar, but stronger than the rank correlations of 0.732 to 
0.906 reported by Baumol et al. (1990). Therefore, the greater the output of the mutual 
fund complex measured by the number of funds, the smaller the degree of economies of 
scale.
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Figure  1  presents the estimated average hedonic translog cost functions for the 
mutual fund complexes in our sample. An increase in the number of funds implies a 
decrease in average costs. The decrease in costs is higher for smaller mutual fund 
complexes and the costs fall less the greater the number of funds offered. The relatively 
 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
                                                       
13  The positive values for the rank correlations result from the use of the cost elasticity as the measure 
for scale economies (see Baumol et al. (1990) on this point).   17 
flat cost curves for high number of funds indicate that there might be some optimal 
number of funds. The median costs per fund are close to TEUR 100. The cost function 
following the HT and within specifications are similar to each other. The highest cost 
function is estimated by the GLS model indicating that the results of the GLS 
estimation are positively biased. The lowest cost function is estimated by the POLS 
model. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
In figure 2  the estimated cost functions for the size quartiles are shown. As 
expected,  it illustrates a clear size trend for the estimated costs. The corresponding 
median values decrease from approximately TEUR 10,000 for size quartile 1 to TEUR 
450, TEUR 170, and TEUR 50 for size quartiles 1, 2, and 3. Again, the results for size 
quartile 1 are biased upwards due to the inclusion of the mutual fund complexes 
offering real estate funds. For size quartiles 1 to 3 the HT and within specifications are 
again very similar and the GLS results are the highest whereas the POLS results are the 
lowest. It is only in size quartile 4 that the results of the HT and the within models 
differ slightly. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
In table 6 we finally present results on overall cost efficiency. In order to measure 
cost efficiency we compare each individual complex with the most efficient complex in 
the dataset (in the respective size quartile) for each year and average over all years and 
complexes in the dataset (in the respective size quartile). A value of less than one 
indicates inefficiency. 
The most efficient mutual fund complexes in our sample are the complexes in size 
quartile 3. But there is no clear size trend in the data with regards to scale economies, 
since the largest complexes are, together with the complexes in size quartile 2, the most 
inefficient ones. An explanation for this result might be that at a certain number of 
funds offered, mutual fund complexes no longer need to save costs by enhancing their 
processes, because the higher fees due to the increased size more than compensate the 
increase in operating expenses. The results for cost efficiency of size quartile 1 are 
interesting. Mutual fund complexes of this size quartile are by far more efficient than 
the next larger complexes as well as the largest complexes of our sample. Although size   18 
quartile 1 mainly consists of mutual fund complexes offering real estate funds which we 
expect to be more heterogenous than security funds, they are cost efficient in relative 
(not in absolute) terms. 
To sum up, in our sample mutual fund complexes on the one hand exhibit 
economies of scale for all size quartiles and the degree of scale economies decreases as 
size increases. On the other hand, the operating processes for all size quartiles are far 
from cost efficient. 
5  Conclusion 
In our empirical analysis of a panel of 41 mutual fund complexes in Germany for 
the  period from  2002 to 2005 we found evidence of strong and significant scale 
economies for the overall sample as well as the size quartiles. This finding is in line 
with previous research on scale economies for mutual fund complexes and individual 
mutual funds. Cost efficiency was shown to deviate considerably from the optimum. 
These results show that even the largest mutual fund complexes in our sample have not 
reached an optimal size as well as efficient operating processes. 
The  implications for mutual fund complexes are  that they could increase their 
product range by issuing new funds or by merging with other complexes. Since a major 
part of costs is caused by back-office operations, it may be profitable to merge back-
office operations of different mutual fund complexes.
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For policy makers, there are also two implications. Firstly, an increase in size 
should not be prevented, but should possibly be encouraged. Secondly, incentives for 
enhancing the operating processes should be introduced, e.g. by allowing master-feeder 
structures for the pooling of assets from different mutual funds. Yet policy makers 
should also formulate measures which force the mutual fund complexes to give back 
most of the saved expenses due to scale economies to the investors. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the main costs of mutual fund complexes have to be covered by the 
 We do not suggest that mutual 
fund complexes should grow without bounds, because growing in size corresponds to 
inefficiencies in the operating processes. 
Despite this result of suboptimal size, it is interesting that we observe no merger 
activity for the mutual fund complexes in our sample during the period from 2002 to 
2005. The reason for the absence of mergers is rooted in the subsidiary status of most of 
the complexes. This may impose a severe obstacle for mergers among mutual fund 
complexes in Germany.   19 
management fees of the funds. But in Germany these management fees are, at least for 
retail funds,  mostly fixed percentages of the assets under management. To enable 
investors participate in scale economies achieved at the level of the complex, the 
percentage of management fees may be reduced when the assets increase. In return, in 
order to ensure that at least the overhead costs are covered, a minimum management fee 
in the form of an absolute euro amount may be implemented. 
As already mentioned in section 2, extrapolating these results to the German 
investment industry as a whole should be done with caution due to the bias in our 
sample towards larger mutual fund complexes. In spite of these limits to generalization, 
our results provide useful insights into the cost structures and cost efficiencies of 
German mutual fund complexes. 
In further research one should analyze the interaction between scale economies and 
cost efficiency in more detail. Furthermore, the funds offered may be split into their 
major components for retail security and real estate as well as institutional security and 
real estate funds. This breakdown will also allow for analysing economies of scope 
which were not covered in this study. But in the case of separated fund categories, the 
problem of zero outputs has to be addressed. Since a Box-Cox transformation as used in 
Christensen and Greene (1976) comes with the disadvantage of the impossibility to 
estimate standard errors of the regression coefficients (see Greene (2003) on this point), 
a specification suggested by Pulley and Braunstein (1992), which is quadratic in outputs 
and log-quadratic in inputs may have to be employed. 
                                                                                                                                                           
14  Indeed, in 2008 two of the largest mutual fund complexes merged their back-office operations.   20 
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Table 1 
Transition probabilities for size quartiles 
 
Year-to-year  2002-03  2003-04  2004-05 
  Quartile  Quartile  Quartile 
Quartile  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4 
1  90  10  0  0  100  0  0  0  90  10  0  0 
2  9  91  0  0  0  100  0  0  9  82  9  0 
3  0  0  100  0  0  0  100  0  0  10  90  0 
4  0  0  0  100  0  0  0  100  0  0  0  100 
This table shows the transition probabilities of the size quartiles from one year to the next. The numbers 
are given in percentages. Note that the number of companies in the second size quartile is 11 whereas the 
respective number for the other size quartiles is only 10. Therefore, the columns do not add up to 1.   25 
Table 2 
Representativeness of the sample 
 
    Product type  Investor category 
Year  Total  Security  Real estate  Retail  Institutional 
2002  69.40  72.89  42.86  73.87  68.30 
2003  69.52  73.10  41.35  74.47  68.31 
2004  69.79  74.00  39.17  73.32  68.36 
2005  69.27  79.73  33.81  72.45  68.34 
This table shows the representativeness of the used dataset. The numbers are given in percentages. The 
sample shares were calculated on the basis of the total number of funds. Note that mutual fund complexes 
in Germany can offer both security and real estate funds to retail as well as to institutional investors. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics of the dataset 
 
  Total  Size quartile  Product type  Investor category 
  Sample  1  2  3  4  Security  Real Estate  Retail  Institutional 
Operating Expenses in TEUR per fund  2,118.82  7,886.19  347.35  290.81  128.06  272.04  7,367.55  2,192.85  716.71 
  (4,982.4)  (7,641.65)  (249.84)  (369.89)  (67.32)  (282.36)  (7,609.33)  (5,079.03)  (1,475.91) 
Number of funds  107.82  4.97  26.16  87.42  320.88  137.00  9.58  109.39  123.23 
  (150.97)  (4.09)  (10.25)  (28.40)  (170.21)  (159.19)  (15.37)  (153.35)  (157.23) 
Total assets under management in EUR bn  12.98  6.95  3.72  11.03  31.15  14.69  7.69  13.28  13.60 
  (16.32)  (4.56)  (3.46)  (14.47)  (19.84)  (17.97)  (4.61)  (16.58)  (17.05) 
Average fund size in EUR bn  667.05  2,362.39  149.43  115.08  93.07  135.24  2,217.49  692.34  244.23 
  (1,547.76)  (2,461.98)  (180.77)  (116.62)  (25.60)  (169.73)  (2,431.05)  (1,577.23)  (416.52) 
Age in years  21.67  22.60  12.59  22.70  29.70  20.94  21.98  22.32  21.69 
  (14.65)  (15.60)  (9.84)  (11.99)  (15.58)  (14.39)  (15.11)  (14.59)  (14.65) 
Observations  41  10  11  10  10  32  10.75  39.25  35.25 
This table presents summary statistics of the dataset. Reported are the equal-weighted mean values with standard deviation in parentheses. All money amounts are expressed in real 
terms. Note that mutual fund complexes in Germany can offer both security and real estate funds to retail as well as to institutional investors. Further note that size quartile 1 mainly 
consists of mutual fund complexes offering real estate funds. Operating expenses include material costs, personal expenses, and depreciation as reported in the profit and loss 
statement. Age is calculated as the difference between the respective time period and the year authorization of the supervisory authority was granted. 
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Table 4 
Empirical results of the regression models 
 
  Explanatory variable  POLS  GLS  Withinc  HT 
x1  ln(No. of funds)  0.3090  0.4402  0.3807  0.3847 
    (0.0010)  (0.0000)  (0.0507)  (0.0000) 
  ln(No. of funds)
2  0.1144  0.1227  0.1033  0.1047 
    (0.0025)  (0.0000)  (0.0859)  (0.0001) 
  ln(Assets under management)  0.4935  0.1354  -0.1019  0.0320 
    (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.2446)  (0.3295) 
  Business Share Retail Real Estate  0.1948  1.0751  5.0786  1.3440 
    (0.3649)  (0.0000)  (0.0195)  (0.0016) 
  Business Share Institutional Security  -0.8540  -0.1303  0.7879  0.2845 
    (0.0012)  (0.0372)  (0.1640)  (0.1428) 
  Business Share Institutional Real Estate  0.4538  0.8566  4.8579  1.1744 
    (0.0700)  (0.0000)  (0.0237)  (0.0063) 
x2  ln(Age)  0.0521  0.3051  0.6766  0.5964 
    (0.3186)  (0.0000)  (0.0225)  (0.0000) 
z2  Dummy Location  0.2404  0.1630  -  1.8456 
    (0.0157)  (0.0000)  -  (0.0035) 
  Dummy Subsidiary  0.3301  0.3523  -  2.7314 
    (0.0420)  (0.0000)  -  (0.0387) 
This table presents the estimated coefficients of the one-way error component model in equation (1) by 
the different estimators. The p-values reported in parentheses are calculated using robust standard errors 
following the procedure in Arellano (1987) based on White (1980). The number of observations for each 
regression is 164. x1 denotes time-varying variables that are uncorrelated with the individual effects. 
Time-varying, but correlated variables are denoted by x2. Finally, z2 are time-invariant variables which 
are correlated with the individual effects.   28 
Table 5 
Empirical results for overall economies of scale 
 
  POLS  GLS  Within  HT 
Total sample  0.3090  0.4402  0.3807  0.3847 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Size quartile 1  -0.0782  0.0249  0.0311  0.0297 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Size quartile2  0.1383  0.2571  0.2266  0.2282 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0002)  (0.0000) 
Size quartile 3  0.2793  0.4084  0.4130  0.4130 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Size quartile 4  0.4211  0.5604  0.4819  0.4875 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
This table presents the results for economies of scale calculated by equation (2) on the basis of the 
different regression models. The reported values of scale economies for the size quartiles are the equal-
weighted means of the scale economies parameters of the companies in the respective size quartile.   29 
Table 6 
Empirical results for overall cost efficiency 
 
  GLS  Within  HT 
Total sample  0.3853  0.0976  0.1902 
Size quartile 1  0.4376  0.3682  0.3859 
Size quartile 2  0.3864  0.3697  0.2545 
Size quartile 3  0.4770  0.4289  0.5026 
Size quartile 4  0.4085  0.3301  0.2819 
This table presents the results for cost efficiencies calculated by equation (2) on the basis of the different 
regression models with the exception of the POLS specification. The reported values of cost efficiency 
for the size quartiles are the equal-weighted means of the cost efficiency parameters of the complexes in 
the respective size quartile.   30 
Figure 1 
Estimated cost functions for the total sample 
This figure presents the average operating expenses calculated by equation (2) for the total sample in 
TEUR per fund. The values on the abscissa correspond to the size quantiles of the number of funds for 
the total sample, i.e. the value of 50 equals the median of the number of funds that a mutual fund 
complex in our sample offers to investors. The solid line is the estimated average cost curve for the POLS 
model. The dotted line represents the estimated average cost curve for the GLS specification. The 
estimated average cost curve for the Within specification is displayed by the dash-dotted line whereas the 
dashed line is the estimated average cost curve for the HT model.   31 
Figure 2 
Estimated cost functions for the size quartiles 
   
        (a) Size Quartile 1                (b) Size quartile 2 
   
        (c) Size Quartile 3                (d) Size quartile 4 
This figure presents the average operating expenses calculated by equation (2) for the different size 
quartiles in TEUR per fund. Panel (a) shows the average operating expenses per fund for size quartile 1, 
panel (b) for size quartile 2, and so on. The values on the abscissa correspond to the size quantiles of the 
number of funds for the respective size quartiles, i.e. the value of 50 equals the median of the number of 
funds that a mutual fund complex in the respective size quartile offers to investors. The solid line is the 
estimated average cost curve for the POLS model. The dotted line represents the estimated average cost 
curve for the GLS specification. The estimated average cost curve for the Within specification is 
displayed by the dash-dotted line whereas the dashed line is the estimated average cost curve for the HT 
model.  
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